Some Remarks on Assertion and Proof by Carrara, Massimliano
Journal of Applied Logics - IfCoLog
Journal of Logics and their Applications
Volume 8, Number 2
March 2021
Some Remarks on Assertion and Proof
Massimiliano Carrara
Department of Philosophy, Sociology, Education and Applied Psychology
(FISPPA) – Padua University
massimiliano.carrara@unipd.it
Daniele Chiffi
DAStU, Politecnico di Milano
daniele.chiffi@polimi.it
Ciro De Florio
Faculty of Economics, Università Cattolica, Milan
ciro.deflorio@unicatt.it
Abstract
In our introduction we make some remarks on the main topics of this issue:
assertion and proof. We briefly describe how each of the papers in the present
publication has contributed from either di erent or complementary perspectives
to the logical reflection on assertion and proof, while also specifying the relation
between them.
1 Introductory remarks
It may sound like a philosophical cliché, but one could not stress enough the im-
portance of the notions of assertion and proof for logic, philosophy of logic and
philosophy of language.
Although these two notions have been undergoing development since the second
half of the 19th century in a relatively independent way within research programs in
logic and linguistics alike, the conceptual relationships between them are undeniable.
In this short contribution to the Special Issue (Assertion and Proof) we will
illustrate some of the (possible) links between proof and assertion.
With “assertion” we denote prima facie at least two rather di erent entities; the
first is a kind of act, i.e. an illocutionary act, namely the act of asserting something;
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the other entity is the outcome of the same act, that is, the asserted thing. We will
see that such prima facie duality of assertion is reflected on its logical treatment.
Consider a proposition. One and the same proposition can occur both asserted
and unasserted in di erent contexts. In particular, Geach [10, p. 449] pointed out
that “[a] thought may have just the same content whether you assent to its truth
or not; a proposition may occur in a discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and
yet be recognizably the same proposition”. A standard example is the justification
of modus ponens: assuming (1) – æ — and (2) –, one infers (3) —. In (2), – is
usually considered asserted, while in (1), – is not asserted, because only the whole
conditional – æ — is asserted (on this, see Russell 1903). This means that the very
same proposition may be used in both its asserted and unasserted forms1.
Moreover, the same line of thought could be, somehow, extended: within any
argumentative structure, the same propositions may be the subject of various illo-
cutionary acts. For instance, one could assume that Ï, then hypothesize that Â,
conjecture that ◊, and so on.
In the light of previous considerations, one can also ask how to provide the
expressive resources in order to describe the formal features of assertions. In a
letter to Frege, Peano wrote that the various positions in which a formula can be
placed determines whether it occurs asserted or unasserted in some truth-functional
context. Using Peano’s words, “the several positions that a proposition can have in
a formula completely determine what is asserted of it” [12, p. 191]. Frege observed
that this is because “the principal relation sign invariably carries assertoric force”
[8, p. 148] without any specific sign for assertion being present in the notation. This
means that in Peano’s notation it is impossible to show whether a complex formula
occurs asserted or unasserted.
In this regard, Frege introduced an ad hoc sign of assertion as a notational
requirement of the logical language. He indicated it with “„”, which stands for the
sign of assertion. (Nowadays, the sign “„”, has acquired the name “turnstile” and
expresses the concept of derivability or provability.)
Once given the expressive resources in order to describe assertions, it becomes
crucial to provide some criteria concerning the logical behaviour of assertions. From
this point of view, it is normally assumed that assertions, intended as acts, cannot be
iterated and cannot be connected by truth-functional connectives [15]. Reichenbach
1Bell [1] comments Russell’s views on modus ponens in the following way: “Now this would imply
that either all inferences having the modus ponens form (to take but one example) are invalid, or, at
least, that all those with either a true antecedent or a true consequent in the conditional premiss are
invalid. This is, of course, quite unacceptable” (pp. 87-88). On the analysis of Russell’s views on
modus ponens and Bell’s untoward consequences, see the justification of modus ponens in pragmatic
logic [3].
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[15, p. 346] claims this on the basis of the fact that the term “assertion” is used
in three di erent ways. Namely, “it denotes, first, the act of asserting; second, the
result of this act, i.e., an expression of the form ‘„p’; third, a statement which
is asserted, i.e. a statement ‘p’ occurring within an expression ‘„p’”. Regarding
the result of an assertion, Reichenbach claims that “since assertive expressions are
not propositions, they cannot be combined by propositional operators” [15, §57, p.
337]. The assertion sign works, according to him, in its “pragmatic capacity”, since
it cannot be, for instance, negated with a propositional connective. And if this is
so, then inferences can be understood as processes that allow us to derive justified
asserted conclusions once the asserted premises are also justified. This means that
there can be no nested or iterated occurrences of the assertion sign, because the
truth-functional connectives only operate on propositions and never on assertions.
Furthermore, inferences operate only on assertions and never on propositions.
The structure of an elementary assertion is thus composed by a unique assertion
sign prefixed to the asserted content. This is, for instance, the case with Frege’s [8]
Begri sschrift. A similar restriction is presented in Reichenbach’s treatise, where
the distinction between assertions and (propositional) content is developed.
Of course, the logic of assertions must engage with the possibility of connecting
elementary assertions in order to construct more complex ones. At play here is in
fact the intertwining between the logical form of asserted contents and the logic of
assertions. It is plausible to claim that asserting a conjunction (Ï · Â) is equivalent
to juxtaposing two elementary assertions, respectively of Ï and Â.
Things are not always so easy. Asserting a disjunction (Ï ‚ Â) does not seem
to be equivalent to asserting Ï or asserting Â. And the same holds for implication.
The logic of assertions is, thus, more complex and, somehow, di erent from the logic
dealing with the asserted content.
This discrepancy becomes more evident if we look at Dalla Pozza’s system
[5]. Within it, complex assertions may be logically combined by an application of
intuitionistic-like connectives. This means that complex asserted formulas may be
expressed through connectives that explicate intuitionistic meanings of logical con-
stants, without a truth-functional behaviour. Moreover, intuitionistic connectives
can indicate the (pragmatic) justification-conditions for (acts of) assertions.
On the basis of this short overview on some fundamental features of the logic of
assertion, we are able to cast some light on the link between the concept of assertion
and the concept of proof.
As we said, when assertions are intended as acts, they are neither true nor false.
Therefore, it is quite natural to employ a non-truth-functional kind of semantics in
order to construe the formula of a logic for assertion. A natural candidate is the
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concept of proof : an assertion is justified (or unjustified) depending on the existence
(or not) of a proof of the asserted content. The reference to the concept of proof
emphasizes the constructive feature of the logic of assertions.
By way of example, it is interesting to notice the justification clause pertaining
to the assertion according to Dalla Pozza and Garola’s [5] approach: in that system,
the implication between two assertions („ Ï ∏ „ Â) is justified if and only if we have
a proof which transforms any proof of Ï into a proof of Â at our disposal. It is,
thus, clear why the outer logic of assertion can be di erent from the inner logic of
asserted contents. We can, for instance, be justified in asserting every instance of
excluded middle (Ï ‚ ¬Ï) without being justified either to assert Ï or to assert ¬Ï.
It is su cient to assume that Ï describes a proposition for which we do not have
conclusive proofs.
We said that an assertion is justified if and only if we have a proof at disposal.
But what is a proof ? Here below we propose some introductory remarks. Let us
start by observing that this is a central notion of the proof-theorethic approach to
logic. According to this, a consequence is identified with deducibility: an argument
È  ) –Í is valid if and only if there exists a proof or a derivation of – from  ,
each of whose steps is intuitively sound. The account is formal, insofar as logical
consequence is identified with derivability in a system of rules of a certain form.
Proof-theoretic semantics is standardly taken as an alternative to truth-condition
semantics. In a nutshell, proof-theoretic semantics is based on the assumption that
the meanings of the logical constants are assigned in terms of proof and of their
inferential role rather than in terms of truth.
Proof-theoretic accounts of consequence are sometimes quickly dismissed. Field,
for example, writes that “proof-theoretic definitions proceed in terms of some def-
inite proof procedure”, and observes that “it seems pretty arbitrary which proof
procedure one picks” and “it isn’t very satisfying to rest one’s definitions of funda-
mental metalogical concepts on such highly arbitrary choices” [7, p. 2]. Etchemendy
similarly observes that “the intuitive notion of consequence cannot be captured by
any single deductive system” [6, p. 2], since the notion of consequence is neither
tied to any particular language, nor to any particular deductive system.
In order to understand what a proof is one can first specify a notion of formal
proof or of informal proof. The formalisation of the idea of proof as a given set of
sequences of symbols underlies the meta-mathematical research pioneered by Hilbert
and Bernays and subsequently developed by Gödel, Gentzen and others. Boolos [2]
famously explored the intensional representation of formal proof through systems of
modal logic in which (⇤) is interpreted as “it is provable that” in a formal sense. A
characteristic axiom (called the “Gödel-Löb axiom”) of the notion of formal prov-
ability is ⇤(⇤Ï æ Ï) æ ⇤Ï. If this axiom is added to the modal system K4, we
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obtain the modal logic G. Such a system was formalized by Solovay [17]. It is com-
plete with respect to transitive and conversely well-founded frames. In this system
the reflection principle ⇤Ï æ Ï does not hold.
Things are di erent in case of informal proofs (intended, for instance, as good
mathematical arguments) which are usually assumed to justify truth, thus accepting
the reflection principle.
The notion of informal or naïve proof received some attention when Gödel, in
the Gibbs lecture [11], asserted his famous dichotomy concerning the nature of the
human mind. Then, Priest characterised a naïve proof as a process of deductive
argumentation by which one establishes certain mathematical claims to be true.
So, supposing there is a mathematical assertion whose truth or falsity is to be
established, one can look for a proof or a refutation to justify it or not. The informal
deductive arguments from basic statements are, according to Priest, “naïve proofs”
[14, 40]. It is interesting to observe that Priest [13], in his “The logic of paradox,”
developed a controversial argument, grounded in the notion of naïve proof, showing
some possible connections between Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem and the
presence of dialetheias (viz., sentences that are both true and false) in the standard
model of arithmetic. This last point has been criticized especially regarding the
notion of naïve proof itself.
2 The contents of the issue
Each of the papers in this special issue contributes from di erent and complementary
perspectives to the logical reflection on assertion and proof as well as on the relations
between these two concepts.
Barés Gómez and Fontaine in Defeasibility and non-monotonicity in dialogues
show how to introduce the notions of defeasibility and non-monotonicity in dialogical
logic, and discuss them in a framework of adaptive dialogical logics.
Bellucci, Chi  and Pietarinen in Beta assertive graphs: Proofs of assertions with
quantification introduce and investigate quantification in the diagrammatic system
of assertive graphs.
Carrara and Strollo in DLEAC and the rejection paradox develop a Dialetheic
Logic with exclusive assumptions and conclusions, both understood as speech acts.
A new paradox – the rejectability paradox – is (first informally, then formally) in-
troduced. Its derivation is possible in an extension of DLEAC contanining the re-
jectability predicate.
Chi  in Asserting boo! and horray! Pragmatic logic for assertion and moral
attitudes proposes a pragmatic logic for expressivist moral attitudes in order to
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deal with the logical problems of expressivism such as the Frege-Geach problem,
the negation problem, etc. The second part of the paper makes some analytic
comparisons with other classical logical systems for expressivist sentences.
D’Agostino, Larese and Modgil in Towards depth-bounded natural deduction for
classical first-order logic present a new proof-theory for classical first-order logic that
allows for a natural characterization of a notion of inferential depth. Unlike natural
deduction, in this framework the rules fixing the meaning of the logical operators
are symmetrical with respect to assent and dissent and do not involve the discharge
of formulas.
De Florio in Reflections on logics for assertion and denial discusses and refines
the justification conditions for assertion and denial in an extension of Dalla Pozza’s
pragmatic logic.
Fait and Primiero in HTLC: hyperintensional typed lambda calculus introduce a
new logical system termed “HTLC”. The system extends the typed lambda-calculus
with hyperintensions and rules to govern them. This allows us to reason with ex-
pressions for extensional, intensional and hyperintensional entities.
Francez in Bilateralism based on corrective denial presents a new variant of bi-
lateralism based on a strong notion of denial, called “corrective denial”. In this
framework, a ground for denial is an incompatible atomic alternative to the denied
formula.
Jespersen in Two tales of the turnstile criticizes, from a hyperintensional per-
spective, the view held by act-theoretic ‘internalists’ who invert the Frege-Geach
point by making force integral to content.
Kürbis in Normalisation for bilateral classical logic with some philosophical re-
marks presents two bilateral connectives, comparable to Prior’s tonk, for which,
unlike the case of tonk, there are reduction steps for the removal of maximal for-
mulas, arising from introducing and eliminating formulas with those connectives as
main operators.
Lemanski in Extended syllogistics in calculus CL addresses the question regarding
to what extent a syllogistic representation in CL (Lange’s Cubus Logicus) diagrams
can be seen as a form of extended syllogistics. The author shows that the ontology
of CL enables numerically exact assertions and inferences.
Morato in Assertions of counterfactuals and epistemic irresponsibility discusses
the so-called “reverse Sobel sequences”, problematic for the variably strict semantics
for counterfactuals. Morato shows, in particular, some limitations of the “principle
of epistemic irresponsibility”, which is assumed to ground the pragmatic view on
this type of counterfactual sequences.
Finally, Schang in A general semantics for logics of a rmation and negation pro-
poses some semantic considerations on the notions of a rmation and negation that
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may help us understand the possible translations among di erent logical systems.
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